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Abstract
The stardom system characterizes creative industries: the demand and revenues
are concentrated on a few bestselling books, movies or music. In this paper, we study
the demand structure between bestsellers and new artists’ productions in the music
industry. We set up an experiment where participants face real choices situations. We
create three treatments to isolate the effect of information and incentives on diversity.
In a first treatment, music is consumed for free without information. In a second one,
subjects receive a prior information on others’ evaluation of songs to study the effect of
word-of-mouth. Finally, in a third one, a real market is introduced and music is bought.
Significant evidence shows that word-of-mouth lowers diversity, while price incentives
tend to lift it. In both treatments, subjects also react to the information or incentives
nature.
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1 Introduction
The structure of the creative industry is generally described as being shaped according
to the 80/20 Pareto law: 80% of the total revenue is made by 20% of the supply. This
stardom economy can be understood in terms of differentiation of talents (Rosen, 1981) or
by the fact that cultural consumption requires knowledge and information (Adler, 1985). As
cultural goods are experience goods (Nelson 1970), they are characterized by an exacerbated
uncertainty. Mimicry can lead to lower search costs and this is why the demand concentrates
on a restrained number of productions. It can also be that consumers benefit from network
effects when imitating others’ consumption. Because of the stardom economy, it can be re-
ally hard for a new artist to enter the market. According to Adler (2006), "consumers prefer
the most popular artist and therefore even an artist who is as talented as the star cannot
entice audiences away from the star, not even by offering a lower price". In other words,
price incentives do not outweigh the prior advantage of settled artists.
In the supply side, because "nobody knows" (Caves, 2000) which production will lead
the stardom system, firms bet on a small sample of artists and invest on large promotion
campaigns to enhance what is called "informational cascades"(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch, 1992, Banerjee, 1992). With the digitalization of the industry, Anderson (2004) pre-
dicted that the "long tail" would smooth the distribution of sales by lowering search costs
and may favor access to new productions. But little is known about what happens when
consumers face choices between bestsellers and new artists’ productions when there are no
search cost.
Consumers are looking for novelty because cultural goods are semi-durable goods (Bianchi,
2002). According to a IFOP sondage (Institut Français d’Opinion Publique, French Institute
of Public Opinion) in 2014, 72% of the young radio listeners (15/34 years old) think that
radio channels broadcast the same songs too often and that the music programming is not
enough diversified. The arousal and satisfaction derived from the consumption of a piece
of music varies over time and exposure: the taste for a specific musical song often increases
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with exposure and then decreases through over-exposure (Hunter and Schellenberg, 2011)1.
But, because it can be costly or risky to try new artists, novelty-seeking behavior might not
be enough to counterbalance the stardom structure of the market.
In terms of public policies, it is crucial to promote creative innovation. A deterioration of
cultural diversity may lead to a decrease in the demand (Benhamou, 2002). In France, radio
channels have the obligation of broadcasting 40% of its songs in French, half of which has to
be new in order to compensate for the stardom structure of the music industry. Exposure
to new entrants can facilitate the demand for novelty since it eliminates uncertainty about
its quality.
In this paper, we study the effect of information and monetary incentives on the distribu-
tion of sales (concentration versus diversity) between bestsellers and new artists in the music
market. According to the literature, word-of-mouth between consumers should concentrate
the demand on artists that are already settled. Regarding prices, there are no important
differentiation in the physical nor digital music market (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2003). Still,
in the concert market, prices are differentiated and artist-related characteristics explains
the level of prices: the career and the popularity of an artist explain higher concert prices
(Decrop and Derbaix, 2014) such that new entrants set lower prices. But, according to the
literature, price incentives would not have any important impact on consumption of novelty.
It remains difficult to analyze the ins and outs of novelty consumption since data are difficult
to gather. If it is possible to access to data on consumption, one cannot know what drives
consumers’ choices (are people influenced by others’ opinion, others’ consumption, market-
ing promotion etc. when they decide what to consume?). In a controlled online experiment,
Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) found that observing other individuals’ behavior actually
increases the skewness of the distribution of the demand. Experimental methods can be
used to isolate the effect of peers’ information (word-of-mouth) and price incentives on the
1Hunter and Schellenberg find that Openness-to-Experience- a personality trait measured in psychology
that characterizes people who have a general appreciation for art, emotion, adventure, variety of experiences
etc.- is correlated with the shape of the function of exposure (linking number of exposures and liking ratings):
while low openness leads to an inverted U-shape function, high openness is linked with a decreasing liking
rating function according to the number of exposures.
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concentration of consumption toward bestsellers. We propose an experiment that simulates
an environment where subjects face real choices between different types of musical songs
(best selling songs and new artists’ productions). We choose to study musical consumption
as it is private consumption and it is easy to reproduce in an experimental laboratory. We
run this experiment on teenagers because they like music (North, Hargreaves and O’Neill,
2000), they are prone to the stardom system and they are influenced by peers’ opinions
(Berns et al., 2010). We create three treatments, the first being an isolated choice treatment
(the Benchmark treatment), a second where subjects receive information about others’ eval-
uation (the Word-of-Mouth treatment) and a third where a real market including prices is
established (the Market treatment). Our experimental design has two main advantages: we
can precisely measure demand for both categories, and, by comparing treatments, we can
isolate the effect of information and pecuniary incentives on the structure of demand in an
experiment without search costs.
We find effects of the two treatments on diversity. Regarding the global consumption,
we find that the Word-of-Mouth has a negative impact on diversity. Conversely, the Market
treatment has a positive impact on diversity since half of the demand is dedicated to best-
sellers and the other half to the new artists’ songs. We then find that the demand is senstive
to the nature of the information and the variability of prices.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. Section
3 presents the results, describing the effect of the Word-of-Mouth and the Market treatments
on diversity and the reactions of the demand to the nature of the word-of-mouth and the
level of prices. Section 4 discusses and concludes.
2 Experimental design
2.1 New Artists versus Bestsellers
To implement new artists’ and stars’ products, participants face two track categories. On
one hand, the "Top 30" category, the bestsellers’ category, gathers the 30 French top sell-
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ing singles from the 29th of October to the 4th of November 20122. One can expect that
teenagers, regarding their age, are mostly exposed to this category. On the other hand, the
new artists’ category is composed of the most popular songs of the French website Noomiz.
Noomiz is a website that enables new artists, who did not sign a contract with a music label
yet3, to offer their production, such that one can assume that these tracks have never - or at
least rarely - been experienced by the participants. We call this category the "New Artists’"
category since it is only composed of unknown artists. During the experiment, we control
for habits regarding the use of websites like Noomiz and results show that the majority of
the sample actually do not use this type of online platforms 4. This confirms our assumption
according to which subjects are not familiar with the songs that New Artists’ category is
composed of.
Both categories are composed of 30 songs each and are characterized by the same lan-
guage and genre distribution5. At each period of choice, participants are facing two songs,
one of each category.6 Both songs belong to the same genre such that we can implement dif-
ferences in popularity: the Top 30 category represents songs for which teenagers are exposed
while the New Artists’ category is composed of songs that the participants could like (they
are of the same genre and of an expected comparable quality as we chose them according to
Noomiz popularity ranking, but they are unknown)7.
2The SNEP (Syndicat National de l’édition Phonographique, French union of the phonographic edition)
establishes each week the official chart of the best selling singles in France. It takes into account the physical
and the digital sales.
3A popularity ranking allows them to encounter professionals of the music industry.
4During our experiment, the subjects were asked : "How do you discover new music?". One of the
proposed answer was "By visiting websites like Noomiz that specialize in offering music from new artists".
Subjects had to answer on a five-point frequency scale. 54% answered "Never", 22% "Rarely", 13% "From
time to time", 5% "Often" and 6% "Very Often".
5Each category is composed of 24 Anglo-Saxon tracks and 6 French ones. In terms of genres, there are
13 electro/dance/remix’s songs, 10 pop/rock/folk and 7 Rap/RnB/Hip-hop/Soul. Songs are classified by
genre by both the SNEP and Noomiz.
6All participant are facing the same set of songs in the same order.
7Throughout the experiment, the Top 30 is actually better evaluated than the New Artists’ category.
This corroborates the idea that people prefer what they have already experienced or frequently experienced
(Bornstein, 1989).
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2.2 Procedure
The experiment consists of 30 listening periods of 90 seconds each. At each period, partic-
ipants are asked to choose between two songs, one from each foregoing category, knowing
that both songs belong to the same musical genre. The countdown starts and they listen to
the chosen song. During the 90 seconds, participants are allowed to switch only once to the
other song, the one that was not initially chosen:
• If a subject decides to switch, she is asked to evaluate the song that she just listened
to on a five-point-scale illustrated by smileys. Then, at the end of the period, she is
asked to evaluate the second song that she listened to (see figure 1).
• If a subject decides not to switch, she is only asked to evaluate the only song she
listened to at the end of the 90 seconds period.
Figure 1 – Period summary
The experiment consists in three distinct treatments. We use a between-subjects design
in such way that each participant takes part in only one of the three treatments.
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The Benchmark Treatment, 2 sessions Subjects (n = 33) are facing the basic proce-
dure described above. This is the control treatment.
The Word-of-Mouth Treatment In the Word-of-mouth treatment (n = 41, 2 sessions),
subjects know the mean evaluation of every song which was observed in the Benchmark
treatment. It appears as a five-star-scale (with mid-stars). This is to simulate Word-of-
Mouth information that can theoretically lead to an informational cascade. If one song has
no evaluation - simply because no one, in the benchmark market, listened to it - participants
are told so.
The Market Treatment In the Market treatment (n = 36, 2 sessions), in each session,
two participants are randomly chosen to play the role of sellers, while the others are buyers.
The supply side
Two subjects are randomly designed to sell one category of music to the others in order to
implement a monopolistic competition : one seller is to offer songs from the Top 30 category
while the other is to offer songs from the New Artists category all along the experiment. At
the beginning of the experiment, this situation is described to them. When the experiment
starts, each seller is assigned to one of the two categories and will only sell this specific
category during the whole session (Top 30 or New Artists). At each period, the sellers listen
to one song of the genre they will have to sell and set a per second price included in a defined
range8.
There overall profit of the seller who sells category j is computed as follows:
Πj =
30∑
t=1
pt,j
∑
i
τt,j,i
where j is the song’s category and τ is the amount of seconds allocated by buyer i to category
j at time t. The seller who makes the highest profit wins a 30 grammes candies’ bag.
8In the Market Treatment, prices are set to be in an experimental money - the ECU - convertible in
candies. Sellers have to set a price from 0 to 20 units of ECU.
7
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Figure 2 – Level of prices for each session of the Market treatment
Note: The lines represent linear regressions of the logarithms of prices by sessions and
categories.
Figure (2) represents the Market sessions and the prices that are set by the sellers. Not
surprisingly, we can see that for both sessions the Top 30 price is almost always higher than
the New Artists’ price such that there are incentives to consume the New Artists’ category.
We can also see that there is a convergence in prices throughout rounds.
The demand side
Besides the two selected sellers, all the other participants from each session are music
buyers. At each period, they are offered one song of each category j at a price pj. They
also have a per period budget of 1800 ECU that diminishes according to the song - and the
associated price - they are listening to. The budget of 1800 is fixed such that even if one
buyer listens to a song set at the maximal price of 20 ECU, she can listen to it during the
90 seconds of the period. At the end of the 90 seconds, what is left from the individual i’s
8
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budget is to be saved9, such that his/her overall saving is:
Si =
30∑
t=1
(1800−
∑
j=1,2
pt,j ∗ τt,j,i)
At the end of the experiment, Si is converted into candies in weight10.
2.3 Sample comparison
110 high-school students were recruited from three distinct French schools’ Academies (Paris,
Versailles and Créteil which are French education authorities for the Île-de-France area) and
participated in the experiment, which was conducted in the Parisian Experimental Economics
Laboratory (LEEP) in November 2012. Each of the participants faced an individual screen
with headphones. At the end of the experiment, they were asked to fill in a questionnaire.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample.
Variables Benchmark Word-of-mouth Market p-value11
n = 33 n = 41 n = 36 two-sample t-test
Mean age 15.06 (0.6) 15.22 (0.52) 15.1 (0.46) ns
Gender (% female) 51.51 51.21 50 ns
Music exposure
Exposure to mainstream 1.61 1.64 2.05 pBvsM = 0.07
music media pWoMvsM = 0.07
Music listening habits
(0: rarely, 4: very often)
Hip-hop/Rap 3.13(1.00) 2.49(1.42) 2.97(1.27) pBvsWoM = 0.04
RnB 3.06(0.98) 2.68(1.39) 3(1.07) ns
Zouk, Dancehall, 1.94(1.43) 1.67(1.30) 2.06(1.43) ns
Raggeaton
Pop 2.70(1.07) 2.51(1.12) 2.38(1.30) ns
Rock 1.81(1.33) 1.97(1.41) 1.65(1.50) ns
Heavy Metal 0.81(1.31) 0.90(1.22) 0.47(0.83) pWoMvsM = 0.08
Jazz/Blues 0.76(1.03) 0.93(0.96) 1.24(1.16) pBvsM = 0.08
Classical 0.45(0.71) 0.98(1.08) 0.71(0.94) pBvsWoM = 0.03
Table 1 – Sample comparison
9It is important that the buyers can save experimental currency in order to control for income allocation
and preference for saving.
10The conversion rate is 2gr. of candies for 1000ECU.
9
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The participants were high-school students who were participating in an open day orga-
nized by the University of Paris 1. Several high-schools were invited to participate in order
to introduce research in economics to the students. Besides the conferences, one of the main
activity of this event was to take part in our experiment. Groups were allocated randomly
to the three treatments. Nevertheless, the three Academies were not present on the same
day in such way that each session was composed of students from the same Academy12. The
fact that participants are not coming from the same Academy can explain the difference in
musical listening habits. These differences can also be due to the fact that we are using a
relatively small sample. However, we control afterwards for musical tastes and it does not
change our results.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive results
First, we study the impact of information and incentives on the overall consumption dis-
tribution. In Figure 3, we can see that the average demand is skewed toward the Top 30
category for the Benchmark treatment and the Word-of-Mouth treatment while it is almost
equally distributed in the Market treatment.
The Word-of-Mouth treatment has a negative impact on the demand for novelty: while
subjects listen to 36 seconds (40%) of the New Artists’ category on average in the Benchmark
treatment, they only listen to 30 (33%) seconds of it in the WoM treatment (a Mann-Whitney
test yields p<0.001). On average, the Top 30 category was better rated than the New Artists’
category along the experiment except for only one period. Hence, the average consumption
in the Benchmark and the Word-of-Mouth treatments might reflect the quality difference
between the two categories.
11ns means that all the two-sample t-tests are non significant. Only significant ttests’ p-values are reported.
12A table describing the distribution of participants by treatment can be found in the Appendix.
10
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Figure 3 – Average Consumption of the New Artists’ category by Treatments (in sec)
The Market treatment has a positive and strong effect on the demand for new artists’
productions. Indeed, subjects listen to 47 (52%) seconds of the New Artists’ category on
average, versus 30 seconds (33%) in the Benchmark treatment (a Mann-Whitney test yields
p<0.001). Since the New Artists’ category is always cheaper than the Top 30 category, pe-
cuniary incentives to buy it actually drive subjects to consume more of it.
Figure (4) compares the distribution of the average time spent on New Artists over the 30
periods of the experiment by treatment. The skewness of the distribution in the Benchmark
and the Word-of-Mouth treatments shows that very few participants dedicate the majority
of their time on New Artists on average. Concerning the Market, we can see that the dis-
tribution is more spread such that three consumption profiles appears: consuming relatively
more in the Top 30 category, consuming relatively more in the New Artists’ category and
consuming both categories almost equally.
11
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Figure 4 – Distribution of time spent on New Artists’ over the sample by treatment
Note: The distributions are kernel density.
3.2 Estimation
To confirm these descriptive results, we run an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
analysis, clustered on individuals (see Table 2). The first column (1) only contains two
dummies as explanatory variables corresponding to the Word-of-Mouth and the Market
treatment. The dependent variable is the time spent listening to the New Artists’ category (in
seconds)13 and the OLS regression enhances the effect of the Word-of-Mouth treatment and
the Market treatment. In Column (2), we add variables as controls. While the first treatment
has a significant negative impact, lowering the expected time dedicated to New Artists (-5.4
seconds), the second has a significantly positive impact, raising the expected consumption
(+14 seconds). There is also a significant effect of the beginning of the experiment such that
the expected value of the time spent on the New Artists’ category is about 6 seconds higher
during the first 15 rounds. It seems that there is an exploratory period where subjects wish to
13Note that regressing the time spent on the New Artists’ category is similar to regressing the time spent
on the Top 30 as the two variables are complementary.
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try more of the New Artists’ category. While all the control variables for listening habits do
not yield any significant effect, the exposure to mainstream radio channels14, that generally
broadcast the Top 30 songs, has, without surprise, a negative impact on the expected time
dedicated to the New Artists’ category. All things being equal, choosing the New Artists’
song first has an important positive impact on the expected listening time (+17.5 seconds).
It might be the case that subjects need time to evaluate and experience the first song they
chose to listen such that an anchor effect might appear. Finally, the quality difference, which
is the difference between the overall mean evaluation of the Top 30 and the New Artists songs
per period15, negatively impacts the time spent on New Artists (-2.2 seconds). By controlling
for the quality difference between both songs, we are able to isolate the pure signal effect of
the Word-of-Mouth treatment.
14Mainstream exposure is a continuous variable on a five points scale that combines answers, on a five-
point Likert scale each, to the following questions: "how often do you listen to the following radio channels?:"
• NRJ
• Fun Radio
• Voltage
• Virgin Radio
• Skyrock
• Ado FM
These French radio channels are broadcasting mainstream music and top charts.
15Here, the average evaluations used for the quality difference measure is to be distinguished with the
average evaluation used in the Word-of-Mouth treatment. In the first case, it is measured by the overall
sample’s evaluations while in the second case, the average evaluation is calculated only with the subjects’
evaluations of the Benchmark treatment.
13
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Table 2 – OLS estimations of Time Spent on New Songs
Time spent on the New Artists’ Category
VARIABLES (1) (2)
WoM -5.440* -5.371**
(3.262) (2.609)
Market 11.417*** 14.046***
(3.901) (3.380)
Mainstream radio -3.553*
(2.093)
New Artists First 17.525***
(3.441)
Quality difference -2.275***
(0.793)
round_1_15 5.061***
(1.262)
Female -2.118
(3.520)
Age 3.351
(3.226)
Constant 35.702*** -15.931
(2.057) (50.436)
Control variables
for musical listening habits NO YES
Observations 3,129(106) 3,069(104)
R-squared 0.054 0.198
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: WoM and Market are two dummy variables equal to 1 if subjects are respectively in the Word-of-
Mouth or Market treatments, 0 otherwise. Maintstream radio is a continuous variable on a 4 points basis.
New Artists first is a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject chooses to listen to the novelty song first. Quality
difference if a continuous variable. round_1_15 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the first fifteen rounds,
0 otherwise. Female is a dummy variable equal to 1 for female subjects and age is a continuous variable.
3.3 Demand curves, information and incentives
In the previous section, we found effects of both treatments on the time spent on New Artists.
We now look closer to the reaction of the demand to information and incentives.
The scatter diagrams shown in Figure (5) suggests a linear and positive relationship between
14
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the price ratio16 and the demand share dedicated to the New Artists’ category in the Market
treatment. Participants seem to react and adapt the time allocation to relative prices. The
higher the price of the Top 30 category compared with the New Artists’ category, the higher
the demand share for New Artists. Through this relationship, we find that the Top 30 and
the New Artists’ songs can be considered as normal goods since the demand decreases when
prices increase.
Figure (6) stresses a linear and negative relationship between the rating ratio17 and the
demand share dedicated to the New Artists’ category in the Word-of-Mouth treatment. The
higher the word-of-mouth evaluation of the Top 30 category compared with the New Artists’
category, the lower the demand share for New Artists.
Figure 5 – Demand curves in the Market treatment
Note: The price ratio is equal to the price of the Top 30 song divided by the price of the New Artist’s song.
The line represents a linear regression of the demand share.
16The price ratio is equal to the price of the Top 30 song divided by the price of the New Artists’ song.
17The rating ratio is equal to the mean rating of the Top 30 song divided by the mean rating of the New
Artists’ song. These are the ratings appearing on a five-star-scale in the Word-of-Mouth treatment.
15
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Figure 6 – Demand share dedicated to New Artists in the Word-of-Mouth treatment
Note: The rating ratio is equal to the rating (on a five-star-scale) of the Top 30 song divided by the rating
(on a five-star-scale) of the New Artists’ song. The line represents a linear regression of the demand share.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper attempts to replicate choice treatments where demand meets two types of
music products: superstars and new artists’ productions. A first result of the experiment
remains consistent with the existing literature and shows that others’ opinion strengthen the
stardom effect as the demand concentrates more on the Top 30 category. Indeed, there can
be two origins of this phenomenon: either people rely on others’ opinions to make the best
choice (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Banerjee, 1992), or people benefit from
coordinating with others thanks to community sharing (Adler, 1985). In the two cases, there
is a tendency to imitate others’ behavior and to consider others’ opinions. With informa-
tion, popular products tend to be more popular. In our experiment, the word-of-mouth is
almost always in favor of the Top 30 category to the detriment of the new artist’s demand.
Moreover, subjects react to the nature of the information: the better the evaluation of the
Top 30 category regarding the New Artists’ category, the higher the share of time dedicated
to it.
16
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Our experiment also shows that, when replicating a music market with prices, the aggre-
gate demand is more diversified. We found that with incentives in favor of the New Artists’
category, the demand structure change toward more diversity. This goes against Adler’s the-
ory supposing that new artists cannot entice the demand even with a lower price. Indeed, in
our experiment where there are no search cost nor discussion with others, participants only
know what songs are produced by popular artists. According to Adler, popular artists are
"artists that everybody are familiar with" and popularity constitutes an entry barrier to the
market. Thus, one could expect that because of popularity, participants would not be that
sensitive to price. However, our experiment shows that it is not necessarily the case when
there is only the price and information on popularity (which is of course never the case in
the real world).
The price sensitivity between popular songs and new artists’ songs is an important result
because it is not easy to highlight with field data. Indeed, in the digital and the physical mu-
sic markets, prices are uniform (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2003). In the concert market, prices
are differentiated but difficulties can be encountered when analyzing the relation between
prices and demand. Indeed, some determining data can be unavailable: the prices of resale
tickets, some characteristics of the concert hall like the geographic distance from consumers
etc. Moreover, with an experiment, we can really isolate the effect of prices from the effect
of word-of-mouth.
One other important result is that, in an isolated treatment, new artists entice 40% of
the demand. This result is not easy to stress in the real industry because there are exoge-
nous variables that determine demand. It is even more surprising that teenagers are usually
important consumers of the Top 30. This result lets us think that there are novelty-seeking
behaviors and that people actually seek out new musical productions.
From these results, we can infer public policy recommendations. It remains difficult to
control evaluation of songs on digital platforms but it is possible to subsidize consumption
of new artists’ songs. These subsidies can have real incentives to promote diversity.
Of course, this experiment was conducted on a very specific population: teenagers. It
17
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would be interesting to see if we can replicate these results with adults that may not be-
have the same when facing information or incentives. What would also be interesting in
such a framework is to measure more precisely the level of satisfaction. The level of arousal
and pleasure are variables that can be measured to approximate satisfaction (Bradley and
Lang, 1994), beside the self-declared satisfaction. This way, we could compare the impact
of information and incentives on satisfaction and see if diversity alters or improves general
well-being. Indeed, it is not sure that introduction of differential prices do not alter overall
well-being.
In this article, we show that using experimental methods, we can study the stardom effect
and cultural diffusion. These methods appear to be really useful when data are difficult to
gather or analyze. Moreover, even if we used the music market in our experiment for con-
venience, we believe that, to a certain extend, our result could be applied to other markets
such as books or movies.
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Appendix
The list of songs
Round Genre Artist Title
1 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Kid Cudi Pursuit of happiness
2 Electro/dance/remix Psy Gangnam Style
3 Pop/Folk/Rock Rihanna Diamonds
4 Pop/Folk/Rock BB Brunes Coups et blessures
5 Electro/dance/remix Carly Rae Jepsen Call me maybe
6 Electro/dance/remix Far East Movement Turn up the love
7 Electro/dance/remix Owl City feat Carly Rae Jepsen Good time
8 Pop/Folk/Rock Maroon 5 One more night
9 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Axel Tony feat Tunisiano Avec toi
10 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Canardo feat Tal M’en aller
11 Pop/Folk/Rock Muse Madness
12 Electro/dance/remix Asaf Avidian and The Mojos Reckoning song
13 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Shy’m On se fout de nous
14 Pop/Folk/Rock Birdy People help the people
15 Electro/dance/remix M Pokora feat Tal Envole moi
16 Electro/dance/remix Florida I cry
17 Electro/dance/remix David Guetta She wolf (falling to pieces)
18 Pop/Folk/Rock Emeli Sande Read all about it
19 Pop/Folk/Rock Celine Dion Parler à mon père
20 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Ne-Yo Let me love you
21 Electro/dance/remix Kavinsky Nightcall
22 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Will I am feat Eva Simons This is love
23 Electro/dance/remix Chris Brown Don’t wake me up
24 Electro/dance/remix Alex Clare Too close
25 Pop/Folk/Rock Adele Skyfall
26 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Alicia Keys Girl on fire
27 Electro/dance/remix C2C Down the road
28 Pop/Folk/Rock One Direction Live while we’re young
29 Pop/Folk/Rock Fun We are young
30 Electro/dance/remix Khaled C’est la vie
Table 3 – Top 30 songs
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Round Genre Artist Title
1 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Mama’s rule Inspiration
2 Electro/dance/remix La fèe dèchirèe Bien des choses
3 Pop/Folk/Rock Waterfall Girl!
4 Pop/Folk/Rock Odyl Rouge à lèvres
5 Electro/dance/remix Christine Fucking Youth
6 Electro/dance/remix Saycet Easy
7 Electro/dance/remix Abigoba What is the Link
8 Pop/Folk/Rock Bare Feet Cats Air in the beginning
9 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Jimmy Cena Jusqu’à ce que la mort nous sépare
10 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Panam Panic Positive Justice
11 Pop/Folk/Rock Sophie Oz Promise me again
12 Electro/dance/remix Wasted Wasted Alice
13 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul NJ Si je pouvais
14 Pop/Folk/Rock The Octopus Amazing moment
15 Electro/dance/remix Yalys Inside
16 Electro/dance/remix Lameduza Clever Monkey
17 Electro/dance/remix Casper Whirlin Hope Fool
18 Pop/Folk/Rock Milamarina Unlimited race
19 Pop/Folk/Rock The Cancellers Out of our cave
20 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Adriano Nothing anymore
21 Electro/dance/remix Jade Analogic Creatures
22 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Yoan Trade Union Si tu veux qu’on s’aime
23 Electro/dance/remix DTWICE Please to meet you
24 Electro/dance/remix Bonnie Li Voodoo Doll
25 Pop/Folk/Rock Bats on a Swing No Science-Fiction
26 Rap/Rnb/Hip-Hop/Soul Robbie and the Gang Heavenly
27 Electro/dance/remix Oawl Pour un rien
28 Pop/Folk/Rock Jeans Like a weirdo
29 Pop/Folk/Rock On a White Lane Le chemin de ronde
30 Electro/dance/remix Sexual Earthquake in Kobe Offshore the World
Table 4 – New Artists’ songs
Instructions for the Word-of-Mouth sessions
Welcome,
You are participating to an experiment in economics. At the end of this session, you will
receive a FNAC gift card of 15 euros and a bag of candies and chocolate bars. Please, pay
attention and be careful with the instructions. Do not hesitate to raise your hand and ask
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us any questions. You must not communicate with any other participant during the whole
experiment.
Before and after the experiment, you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire with honesty.
All the answers will remain anonymous.
The experiment During the experiment, you will listen to songs sorted in two categories:
• The "Top 30" category: These are the 30 bestselling songs of the beginning of November
(it can be physical sells, such as CDs bought in any music stores, or digital sells like
songs sold on the web).
• The category "New artist": these are 30 songs from artists who are not on the musical
market yet.
Both of the categories are composed of the following musical genres: pop, rock, rap, rn’b,
electro and dance.
The experiment contains 30 steps of listening time.
• For each step you have 90 seconds during which you can listen to music. You will be
able to see the elapsed time and the remaining time on your scree.
• At the beginning of each step, and before listening to music, two songs will appear on
the screen:
– One will be from the Top 30 category
– The other one will be from the New artist category (that you probably do not
know).
– Both of the songs that appear together on the screen belong to the same musical genre.
For instance, during one step, you can choose between two rap songs (one belongs to
the "Top 30" and the other to the "New artist category, or two pop songs, or two electro
songs etc.).
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– From one step to another, the songs are different, but you will always know that
among the two songs that are proposed to you at a given step, one belongs to the
"Top 30" category and the other to the "New artist" category.
– For each song, there is an evaluation on a five stars scale (it will appear next to
each corresponding songs). The ratings are based on the songs’ evaluations from
your schoolmates, this morning.
If there is no star, it means that no one evaluated this song hence nobody listened
to it. The worst rating is half a star, the best one is five stars. There can be half
stars.
– You will then choose one of the two songs in order to start listening to it.
– At any time, you can decide to switch to the other song. You will then be able
to listen to the other song until the end of the 90 seconds.
WARNING: You can only switch one time: once you decide to switch, you cannot
switch back again.
– If you decide to switch, and when switching to the other song, we will ask
you to evaluate the song you just listened to with smileys that will appear on your
screen (the happier the smiley is, the more you liked the song you just listened to).
When evaluating the song, music and time count stop. Music listening starts
again once you validated your evaluation. At the end of the step, you will be
asked to evaluate the second song you listened to with smileys.
If during the whole step, you decide not to switch and to listen to the same song
during 90 seconds, then, at the end of the step, you will only have to evaluate the
song you chose, with smileys.
These are illustrations of one step:
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Allocation of participants by treatement
The following table describes the number of participants by session. For instance, the Bench-
mark treatment is composed of 18 participants from the Academy of Versailles and 15 par-
ticipants from the Academy of Paris. The Market treatment corresponds to two sessions
with participants from the Academy of Créteil.
Benchmark Word-of-Mouth Market Total
Versailles 18 20 0 38
Paris 15 21 0 36
Créteil 0 0 19 & 17 36
Total 33 41 36 110
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